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Although it is late in a remarkable day, a question remains hanging in
the room which I would like to address: should one, in the end, favor or
oppose the campaign against "corruption" currently being waged by the
assortment of institutions, policy-makers and intellectuals that styles itself
"the international community?" The presentations we have heard today
fall rather neatly on both sides of this question and, by my own count, the
issue divides our speakers roughly in half.
At the same time, no one has said, in so many words, "I oppose the
campaign to eliminate corruption." Those who support the anti-corruption
campaign also hedge their support with doubts, qualifications, hesitations
and cautions. I would like to speculate about the relative absence of clean
statements on this issue and begin to differentiate the "cautions" advanced
by campaign supporters from what I see as the case against the anti-
corruption campaign.
One reason for vagueness among those who oppose the anti-
corruption campaign is clear: opposition to the anti-corruption campaign
might easily be construed as support for corruption. However difficult it
might be to define "corruption," in polite society one must be opposed to
it. Opposition to corruption, much like opposition to terrorism or
genocide or weapons of mass destruction, seems to unite the international
class of commentators (if not yet the practice of the international
community) even in the absence of any consensual definition or
prohibition. Such norms-by-exaggeration are prevalent in international
law, often substituting for the absence of a workable legislative
mechanism. Where the practice is per se reprehensible to all civilized
persons, there is no need for a treaty, with all the concomitant details of
drafting. Where something can be said to "shock the conscience of
mankind," advocates easily find the prohibition they seek. Although it is
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widely recognized that "one person's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter," one is not permitted to speak in favor of terrorism. To oppose
anti-terrorism places one uneasily outside the common sense of the
international community.
My guess is that something like this is going on in the debate about
corruption. Although the term "corruption" is open to all sorts of
interpretations, once something has been at least plausibly swept into the
corruption category, the discursive balance of forces changes. Efforts to
eliminate the practice are harder to oppose. This gives anti-corruption
campaigners a real political and rhetorical advantage, a sort of persuasive
penumbra which overhangs the force of their specific political claim about
abolition of a particular practice in a particular place. Nevertheless, I do
oppose the international campaign against corruption, although I do not
favor corruption. Perhaps we could describe this position as anti-anti-
corruption.
Of course, in all these cases - terrorism, corruption, slavery,
genocide, piracy - there are well established forms for opposition to
particular eradication efforts. It is easiest to oppose campaigns against
terrorism or corruption for their procedural or strategic missteps. Is a
court with universal jurisdiction the best procedure to tackle war crimes?
Reasonable people might differ. But whether this or that slaughter was a
war crime is a different sort of question. Once someone claims some
behavior was genocidal or terroristic or a war crime, a reasonable person
will not want to split hairs or deny the witness's experience by suggesting
otherwise. Especially when the reasonable person wants to be seen to be
neutral in an ideological conflict of interpretations about the meaning of
terrorism or corruption or genocide. One can, of course, dispute the
substantive assertion - contest the definition of genocide, for example -
where the original claim is altogether implausible. But where it is
plausible, disputing the claim will seem unduly subjective, a taking of
sides. These are terms which seem meant to be rather loosely thrown
about. The reasonable commentator will rather accept the claim and
worry about the most effective mode of opposition: is this really the right
vehicle, procedure or strategy? In this sense, we might say that for a
"norm by exaggeration" the substantive persuasive overhang is larger than
the procedural one.
But there is something of a procedural overhang as well. Of course
one might always argue against any procedural overhang - in pursuing the
terrorist or the war criminal or in battling corruption, one should not
descend to the level of those one pursues, one should insist that the
investigation should be transparent, respectful of civil rights, etc.
International war crimes prosecutors should be particularly careful to turn
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square comers. But one can also always argue that these behaviors are
sufficiently reprehensible to justify extraordinary means in their
suppression. It is therefore common to find opinion among those who
support efforts to oppose genocide or terrorism divided between those who
think a current effort at eradication may have gone too far and those who
do not. A reasonable middle ground between these positions would still
leave a persuasive overhang for procedural irregularities, a sort of built in
margin of maneuver for campaigns of this sort.
So also with corruption. Most of the cautions advanced by supporters
of the anti-corruption campaign do not dispute that corruption is an
unmitigated evil. They generally do not dispute whether the range of
government practices which are the target of the anti-corruption campaign
are truly "corrupt." They do wonder whether the anti-corruption
campaign might have gone too far, say by disrupting too much of the local
economic fabric too quickly. Such particular concerns are then often
"balanced" against the overwhelming clarity of the evil done by corruption
(in general), compromising the public trust, economic development or
whatever. This returns the debate to common ground - corruption is
really a terrible thing - and leaves room for the anti-corruption campaign
to incur some, if not too many, procedural costs.
Indeed, any dispute about whether an anti-corruption campaign is a
good or a bad idea is easy to experience rather as a dispute about whether
a particular campaign has or has not gone too far in battling a quite general
evil. Since people who seem to oppose an anti-corruption effort obviously
do not support corruption, it is easy to conclude that they must be opposed
to some procedures or technicalities or unintended consequences of the
particular campaign. Less likely, but also possible, they might feel the
substantive definition of corruption has been overextended to the point
that it is no longer plausible to claim that the practices being opposed are
"corrupt." Indeed, it would be ungenerous not to understand opposition to
an anti-corruption campaign in one of these ways, not to exempt one's
interlocutors from the charge of favoring or not caring about corruption.
But there is a real question whether one should or should not have an
anti-corruption campaign which is different from the question whether a
campaign against corruption could have procedural or definitional
excesses. My goal here is to explore the possibilities for opposition to the
anti-corruption campaign which resist, even if unsuccessfully, being read
as simply a procedural or definitional caution. Let me do this by sketching
in broad terms the sorts of arguments which have been made in our
symposium today against the anti-corruption campaign to explore their
difference, if any, from tactical caution.
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Supporters of anti-corruption efforts express, as we have heard, many
reasons for caution in the endeavor. Some are atmospheric or rhetorical.
Anti-corruption campaigning often mixes moral opprobrium with both
economic theory (corruption stunts development) and faith in a
universalist and rational rule of law. This can be a dangerous ideological
mix. It might even be counterproductive for the campaign as a whole,
particularly where the anti-corruption drive is organized at the center for
application at the periphery. As a tactical matter, echoes of colonialism,
imperialism and the like might blunt acceptance of the anti-corruption
message. As a result, many anti-corruption campaigners are careful to
eliminate moralizing rhetoric and stick to the more rational language of
economic advantage or defense of a presumptively neutral and locally
adopted rule of law.
Despite this caution, opposition to the anti-corruption campaign often
seizes on what seems a stigmatizing moral tone in the campaign that
makes the effort seem unfair to the periphery. I heard at least three
versions of this worry in the presentations at this symposium. First, the
claim that the anti-corruption campaign is the product of a double standard
by the West against the rest - the normal lobbying and campaign financing
practices of Washington law firms are seen as corruption when undertaken
by members of leading families of Pakistan or Indonesia. Second, the
anti-corruption campaign puts pressure on public practices in the Third
World which are no different from the private practices of individuals and
corporations in the First World. Imelda Marcos's shoes are a scandal, but
Bill Gates' house is simply part of the idiosyncratic lifestyle of the rich
and famous. Third, the anti-corruption campaign smacks of victim
blaming - reinforcing the idea that the problems of Third World
economies are the result of policies made at the national level by local
elites, when the decisions of foreign capital and the workings of the
broader world system are far more important. Sometimes this third
criticism seems structural and influenced by dependency or world systems
theory - "the West underdevelops the South" - and sometimes it focuses
on the rapacious suppliers of corruption, "pushers" if you like, in the
North who get weak Third World governments or private institutions
addicted to debt and graft.
Although these criticisms are often advanced with great passion, to
the anti-corruption campaigner they seem oddly off the mark. The
activities of beltway lobbyists may be laudable or not, but if they are
corrupt, they should also be opposed in the strongest terms - the point is
that what the leading families in corrupt Third World situations do is
different - they are corrupt in the sense that they stand outside the rule of
law. One may want to redistribute the Gates fortune, one might wish for
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stronger enforcement of antitrust laws, one might wonder at the profits
Ross Perot made from government service contracts, but all these things
are different from the corruption which is the object of the anti-corruption
campaign. Indeed, efforts to equate these things seem disingenuous in
their refusal to admit that corruption, actual corruption, has been part of
the experience of the post-colonial state. Similarly, whatever one's theory
of development (and perhaps terms of trade are declining, perhaps first
world banks are responsible for the debt crisis, perhaps multinationals do
"push" corrupt payments) it seems indisputable that there would be more
development if local corruption could be eliminated.
Responding to these arguments about stigma requires both a
definition of corruption - how exactly is the Gates fortune different from
the Marcos fortune? - and a link between corruption and
underdevelopment - why is it obvious that less corruption means more
development even if the effects are swamped by the larger currents of
declining terms of trade or destabilizing currency flows? If there are good
clean answers here, then the stigmatizing concerns become simply
cautions about moral overreaching. The anti-corruption campaigner
should, of course, be careful to impugn only things which really are
corrupt and which really are bad for development.
Before going on to see whether the distinction between corruption and
the rule of law and the link between corruption and development are clean
enough to transform these broad criticisms into mere cautions about
overreaching, we should note that arguments about stigma might be robust
even if it turned out one could define quite cleanly how Marcos and Gates
were different and how corruption retards economic growth. This would
be true if the bad ideological effects of the anti-corruption campaign - the
delegitimation of the post-colonial state, the reinforcement of local
responsibility for underdevelopment, and so forth - swamped any
marginal economic gain from the effort. This might, of course, be utterly
impossible to measure - but it is the sort of thing one is likely to have an
instinct about one way or the other. Of course, one person's
delegitimation is another person's just condemnation, but let us say that
my own instinct is that the anti-corruption campaign is vastly more
significant as an ideological tool than as a policy to reduce departures
from the rule of law or advance development.
The rhetorical problem for the anti-anti-corruption advocate is that
this sort of instinct does not have a very large substantive or procedural
overhang. As a result, there is an argumentative imbalance here. The
anti-corruption campaign benefits from the unwillingness of reasonable
people to dispute plausible claims that corruption is taking place - the
clear evil of the practice in general justifies at least some efforts to combat
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it. But the anti-anti-corruption campaign does not benefit from a similar
generosity to the instinct that the campaign seems part of a broader
ideological project of neo-colonialism. There is no countervailing general
consensus about the evils of neo-colonialism, but rather quite the opposite.
Charges of neo-colonialism seem vague and defensive efforts to change
the subject, while charges of corruption seem straightforward efforts to get
to the heart of things.
Either way, however, these arguments about the stigmatizing effect of
the anti-corruption campaign take us to the definition of corruption and its
link to underdevelopment.
For all their doubts, anti-corruption campaigners share confidence
that there is an identifiable thing called "corruption" which has bad effects
on economic performance. The anti-anti-corruption position takes on
these two propositions: that something called "corruption" can be
identified cleanly, and that it will have bad effects on development. Let
me take these two branches of the position - definitional and
consequential - one at a time.
Although a simple definition of corruption would encompass
economic crimes by public figures - stealing tax revenues or accepting
bribes for legally mandated services - the anti-corruption campaign
usually targets something broader than unprosecuted crimes by public
figures. If the anti-corruption campaign targeted only criminal activities
of this sort, it would be far easier to imagine that the ideological effects of
the effort swamped whatever gains might be expected from its successful
pursuit. For the anti-corruption campaign, corruption seems to mean
either a pattern of crimes that erodes faith in a government of laws or
actions by private or public actors which artificially distort prices -
unreasonable finders fees, patterns of police enforcement which protect
Mafia monopolies and other things of that sort. The anti-corruption
campaign moves from the image of public officials stealing things or
taking bribes outward to a larger set of issues which may encompass
action and inaction by both governmental and non-governmental players
which either "distorts" free market prices or are not equally transparent to
locals and foreigners. Corruption has become a code word for "rent-
seeking" - using power to extract a higher price than that which would be
possible in an arms-length or freely competitive bargain - and for
practices which privilege locals.
It may be that what differentiates beltway lobbying fees from the fees
taken by members of a leading family in a post-colonial state for using
political contacts to secure governmental contracts is that one is a crime,
just as Marcos may have stolen what Gates "earned." But most anti-
corruption campaigners have another distinction in mind. Even where
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post-colonial elites play by the rules, the rules by which they play are too
discretionary to conform to the rule of law and this discretionary margin is
exercised in ways which discriminates against outside capital. It is in this
sense that their economies lack "transparency," and in this sense that their
legal systems depart from the rule of law.
The parallel between this way of thinking about underdeveloped or
transitional economies and the rhetoric often used in the West to describe
socialist law is striking. Beyond concern about human rights, when one
said that state socialism lacked the rule of law, one did not mean that there
was a lot of crime; nor did one mean that there was anarchy. One meant
that there was too much political discretion in the application of what were
often densely bureaucratic legal rules, and that this discretion was both
used politically, perhaps to favor party members, and experienced in ways
which were not economically rational, to distort prices and favor local
suppliers. The same sorts of arguments, of course, are now routinely
made about the various quasi-socialist development strategies based on
import substitution which were once prevalent in the Third World and
favored by the international financial community.
At this point, the anti-corruption campaign gets all mixed up with a
broader program of privatization, deregulation and free trade (dismantling
government subsidies and trade barriers, requiring national treatment for
foreign products and enterprises). The anti-corruption campaign also
begins to run parallel to a set of historic debates about the relationship
between a Weberian rule of law and development. These debates,
however, remain arenas of deep contestation; they have none of the
certainty associated with the anti-corruption campaign. It has been
famously difficult to distinguish the sort of administrative discretion
which automatically indicates that a legal system does not qualify as the
rule of law from the sorts of judicial and administrative discretion over
standards and rule interpretation that characterize the routine practice of
the rule of law. It has also been famously difficult to distinguish legal
rules and government practices that distort a price from the background
rules in whose shadow parties are thought to bargain. Indeed, the elites of
different societies often have quite different ideas about what is a normal
and what is an abnormal level of governmental discretion and presence
within the economy, and the best international economic lawyers see the
machinery of GATT or the WTO as designed to mitigate or interface
between conceptual differences of this type rather than to enforce an
international or technical consensus on the issue. Even free trade
absolutists acknowledge that it is often difficult to distinguish a non-tariff
barrier from a structural comparative advantage. The definition of
"national treatment" has been as contested in international economic law
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as "discrimination" has been domestically. Experts have settled on any
number of different methods for resolving these disputed issues, but none
have the stark clarity suggested by the word "corruption."
In this sense, the anti-corruption campaign transforms the politically
or ideologically contestable into the technically necessary and the morally
imperative. Corruption works against and reinforces an idea about the
"normal" arrangement of entitlements. Disturb these and one need not
weigh benefits and burdens, even if one would customarily weigh and
balance in the assignment of those entitlements and in their definitions.
That the arrangement of entitlements normalized in this way might be
interpreted ideologically is easy to see. When the government official
uses his discretionary authority to ask a foreign investor to contribute to
this or that fund before approving a license to invest, that is corruption.
When the investor uses his discretionary authority to invest to force a
government to dismantle this or that regulation, that is expertise. When
pharmaceutical companies exploit their intellectual property rights to
make AIDS drugs largely unavailable in Africa while using the profits to
buy sports teams, that is not corruption, but when governments tax imports
to build palaces, that is corruption, and so forth.
Perhaps the most telling problem is the difficulty of differentiating
some prices and transactions as "normal" and others as "distorted" by
improper exercises of power when every transaction is bargained in the
shadow of rules, both legal and non-legal, which are the outcome of
political decision-making and which are administered and interpreted with
large measures of discretion. This old American legal realist observation
about the ubiquity of state action makes the idea that transactions, national
or international, should be allowed to proceed undistorted by
"intervention" or "rent-seeking" incoherent. There is simply no substitute
for asking whether the particular intervention is a desirable one. In this
sense, the anti-corruption campaign, even at its core, is an effort to
stigmatize some exercises of power in the economy and to legitimate
others. It seems reasonable to ask both what the campaign stigmatizes,
and whether the effects of these particular exercises of power are, or are
not, desirable from the perspective of both distribution and growth.
This takes us from the problem of defining corruption to the question
of its effects on economic performance. If corruption could be more
clearly distinguished from other forms of everyday legal and political
discretion, it might be possible to speak of the social effects of corruption,
the erosion of the national moral climate, and so forth. Where corruption
blends more easily into other disputed forms of public and private power,
effects of this sort are harder to isolate. The consequences for economic
growth, however, are often presented by anti-corruption campaigners as
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beyond dispute. Even this, however, returns us to the difficulties of
definition. Without a clean definition, it is difficult to isolate the
distortions of public or private property rights which should be opposed
automatically, without reference to their distributional consequences,
because distortion alone will have a negative impact on economic
development. And yet, rather than a coherent core definition, we find a
constellation of disconnected worries about distortions of the relationship
between public and private rights. Sometimes anti-corruption
campaigners are worried about the private use of public property,
sometimes about the public use of private property, sometimes about
illegitimate private power (the Mafia) extorting public benefits and
sometimes about public power extorting private payments.
It is difficult to link such a wide variety of practices in any
compelling way to economic growth. As Paul Stephan has pointed out,'
even if we define the problem narrowly as one of theft or conversion
(making it difficult to see what calling it "corruption" might add) it is still
difficult to be confident that the result will be slower growth. Sometimes,
as every first year property instructor is at pains to explain, it is a good
idea to rearrange entitlements in this way, adverse possession being the
most dramatic example.
Moreover, the links between particular legal rules and economic
development are famously disputed. The old adage "if you can't take care
of your own family, how can you take care of the city" often does ring
true. As we heard at this Symposium, at least for more primitive, pre-
modern, feudal sorts of situations (and I wonder if the same could not be
said about sectors of the most modern economy), the informal economy
may be more crucial than the formal economy, and efforts to rationalize it
or render it transparent might be quite harmful to economic growth, at
least in the short or intermediate run. In some situations, practices one
might label as "corrupt" might be more efficient means of capital
accumulation, mobilizing savings for local investment. It is not only the
local economy which may be characterized as informal. It turns out that
most international trade is not an arm's-length transaction carried on at a
market price, but rather some combination of barter, internal
administratively priced transactions, relational contracts between repeat
players and so on. In all these situations the distributional consequences
of formalization are notoriously hard to predict. Sometimes what look like
corrupt local preferences might turn out to be efficient price
discrimination, what look like market distorting interventions might
1. See Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, published
concurrently in this volume.
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compensate for a variety of market failures. In situations of unstable
equilibrium, market failure or path dependence, administrative or private
discretion might be good for growth. As John Ohnesorge reminds us,2 the
years of greatest growth for the Asian tigers coincided with legal and
administrative practices which were famously discretionary and opaque to
outsiders. Finally, even if the move from a "corrupt" legal regime to a
"not corrupt" regime produces a one time efficiency gain, there is no good
economic theory predicting that this will lead to growth or development
rather than simply to another low level equilibrium.
Consequently, anti-corruption campaigners are often cautious to
admit that anti-corruption should not be taken too far, should not disrupt
efficient and functional social networks or eradicate the informal
economy, especially where the formal economy is characterized by large
scale market failures and inefficiencies. A campaigner thinking about
anti-corruption efforts in ex-socialist societies, for example, wants neither
to preach nor to deny that, at least under state socialism, it was often
rational or efficient to work in the informal or black economy. Similarly,
in Third World contexts, an anti-corruption campaigner wants to be seen
neither to impose his or her own governmental form nor to underestimate
the extent to which "non-economic" modes of social organization may
have been part of a functioning pre-capitalist local culture. Most anti-
corruption campaigners are quick to recognize and seek to soften the
disruptions of the pre-modern social order which will accompany
modernization.
But these hesitations and cautions are not, in my mind, sufficient. It
would be terrific to engage in detailed examination of various legal
regimes and rules to determine, as best one could, what their likely impact
on growth might be in particular contexts. Sometimes, no doubt,
increasingly formal or transparent rules would be a good idea. Sometimes
less governmental discretion, sometimes more vigorous criminal
enforcement, broader distribution of supply relationships, less local
preference in contracting, might all be very helpful. But sometimes we
would also expect the opposite. The point of the anti-corruption campaign
is to avoid assessments of this sort by suggesting that some broad category
of rules and regimes is bad for development in general.
It is not surprising that anti-corruption proposals follow familiar
pathways, or that they often involve exactly the rule changes which will
make local economies available for foreign direct investment. The
existing system for distributing licenses or offering administrative
2. See John K.M. Ohnesorge, Ratcheting Up the Anti-Corruption Drive: Could a Look at Recent
History Cure a Case of Theory-Determinism?, published concurrently in this volume.
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discretion in a developing society might be entirely predictable for local
players even where it is not done in accordance with published rules, and
allocating these opportunities to local players might be the best policy
from the point of view of development. But these determinations are often
neither favorable nor transparent to foreign investors. It may well be that
in the long run it is not politically possible or economically desirable for a
Third World society to do anything which does not meet with the approval
of foreign direct investors, but this is a different sort of claim than the
claim that without an aggressive anti-corruption campaign development
will be retarded.
The anti-corruption campaign is a fascinating initiative by the
international financial institutions and development policy mavens of the
First World. It clearly taps into a widespread sense of illegitimacy - we
must all oppose corruption. When one begins to define the object of this
quite general condemnation not just morally but in terms of the rule of
law, and to specify its link to retarded economic development, quite
familiar difficulties emerge. Suddenly the effort to battle corruption
becomes an effort to stigmatize some economic policies and some legal
regimes at the expense of others precisely without analyzing their
distributional or social consequences in any specific detail. It is in this
sense that the anti-corruption campaign, even at its most reasonable core
remains an ideological project, an effort to leverage the rhetorical
advantages of a shared moral opprobrium for a series of specific legal or
institutional changes without having to specify who will win and who will
lose as a consequence.
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